The Effect of Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code Upon Chattel Mortgages in Kentucky by Cooper, Richard D.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 47 | Issue 1 Article 7
1958
The Effect of Article Nine of the Uniform
Commercial Code Upon Chattel Mortgages in
Kentucky
Richard D. Cooper
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cooper, Richard D. (1958) "The Effect of Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code Upon Chattel Mortgages in Kentucky,"
Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 47 : Iss. 1 , Article 7.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol47/iss1/7
KFwcKy LAw JouRNAL[
THE EFFECT OF ARTICLE NINE OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE UPON CHATTEL MORTGAGES
IN KENTUCKY
Introduction
The Uniform Commercial Code' introduced by Senator F. H.
Bassett, Jr. was passed unanimously by the 1958 General Assembly and
signed by Governor Chandler to become effective July 1, 1960. The
Code consists of nine articles and repeals Stock Transfer, Negotiable
Instruments, Warehouse Receipts, Sales, Bank Collection, Bulk Sales
and numerous other sections of the Kentucky Statutes. This note will
be limited to a discussion of Article Nine of the Code and what
effect it will have on the law concerning chattel mortgages in Ken-
tucky. Before beginning a comparison of the present law in Ken-
tucky with the Code, it seems appropriate to state the purpose of
Article Nine of the Code.
The Security Interest
Article Nine combines all the various security devices into one
category referred to as a security interest. A security interest is de-
fined as "an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures
payment or performance of an obligation." 2 The Code applies to
"any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create
a security interest in personal property or fixtures, including goods,
documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper, accounts
or contract rights; and also to any sale of accounts, contract rights or
chattel paper."3 Among the various security devices included in the
term "security interest" are the pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage,
chattel trust, trust deed, factor's lien, equipment trust, conditional
sale, trust receipt, other lien or title retention contracts, and lease or
consignment intended as security.4 The broad purpose of the Code is
to eliminate all of these security devices by substituting the new
device called a security interest. In achieving this result the Code
has adopted a terminology of its own. Instead of referring to the
mortgagor, pledgor, or assignor, the term "debtor" is substituted.5
In place of the mortgagee, assignee, or pledgee, the Code uses the
1 Hereafter to be referred to as the "Code."
2 UCC see. 1-201 (37).
3UCC sec. 9-102 (1) (a) (b).
4UCC sec. 9-102 (2).
5 A debtor is defined as "the person who owes payment or other perform-
ance of the obligation secured ... ' UCC sec. 9-105 (1) (d).
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term "secured party,"6 and for mortgage, pledge, or assignment, the
Code has adopted the term "security agreement."7 Other new terms
are "consumer goods," "equipment," "farm products" and "inven-
tory."8 It is essential to understand the meaning of this terminology
as defined under the Code, since many rights are based upon these
classifications. For example, an automobile if used for personal,
family, or household purposes would be classified as a consumer
good; if being held or being prepared for sale it would be classified
as inventory. 9 Because filing requirements for a security interest in
consumer goods differ from filing requirements for a security interest
in inventory, improper classification could result in improper filing.10
However classification of the collateral may not be as important
in Kentucky because, as will be shown, Kentucky. retained their
present system of recording instead of adopting either of the alter-
natives presented by the Code.
Rights of the Parties and Rights of Third Parties
By statute in Kentucky a deed of trust or any other instrument
given to secure any present or future indebtedness, and which oper-
ates as a mortgage, pledge or lien upon personal property, is consid-
ered to be a chattel mortgage.'1 In accordance with this statute the
court has said:
[W]hatever may be the name or form of a transaction, when it is
designed to hold personal property as a mere security for a debt, it
is regarded as a chattel mortgage.' 2
Furthermore, the court has held that trust receipts'5 and conditional
sales contracts14 should be treated as chattel mortgages. However,
0 A secured party is defined as "a lender, seller or other person in whose
favor there is a security interest, . . ." UCC sec. 9-105(1) (i).
7 A security agreement is defined as "an agreement which creates or provides
for a security interest," UCC see. 9-105 (1) (h).8UCC sec. 9-109 (1) (2) (3) (4).
9 See the definitions of "consumer goods," UCC sec. 9-109(1) and "in-
ventory," UCC sec. 9-109(4). For a discussion of the problems of classification
under Article Nine of the Code see Funk, "Problems of Classification Under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code," 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 703.
10 For a criticism of the classification of goods in connection with the filing
requirements, see Beutel, "'The Proposed Uniform (?) Commercial Code Should
Not Be Adopted In Ohio," 14 Ohio St. L. J. 3, 28-30.
11Ky. Rev. Stat. sec. 882.600(1) (b) (1956). (Hereafter referred to as
K.R.S.).
12 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Sharp Motor Sales Co., 283 Ky.
290, 293, 25 S.W. 2d 405, 406 (1930).
13 Commercial Investment Trust Corporation v. Wilson, 58 F.2d 910 (Ky.
1932).
14 Munz v. National Bond and Investment Co., 243 Ky. 293, 47 S.W. 2d
1055 (1932).
1958]
KEN=UCX=Y LAW JouRNAL[V
an assignment of a chose in action, such as an account receivable, is
not treated as a chattel mortgage since a chose in action is not con-
sidered personal property. 15 Kentucky, by treating all security trans-
actions as chattel mortgages except those transactions concerning a
chose in action, is in spirit much in accord with the Code treatment
since, as pointed out previously, the broad purpose of the Code is to
combine the various security devices into one category called a
security interest.
Kentucky requires by statute that a chattel mortgage be acknow-
ledged in order to be recorded. 16 The purpose of the statutory re-
quirement, in making sure the instrument lodged for record is in
fact signed and acknowledged by the mortgagor, is to prevent fraud.' 7
The court has held that an unacknowledged mortgage is good as
between the parties' 8 but, as to third persons it does not give construc-
tive notice even though it is recorded. 19 The decisions seem illogical
for if an unacknowledged chattel mortgage is good as between the
parties, it should give constructive notice when in fact recorded. The
requirements of acknowledgment with its purpose of preventing fraud
should have no bearing on notice in the absence of fraud. The Code
would eliminate what the writer considers an unjust result, since the
Code does not require that a security agreement be acknowledged.
Under the Code, the only formal requirements necessary to create
a security interest are that the security agreement be signed by the
debtor, and contain a description of the collateral.2 0
Like the Code, Kentucky requires that the chattel mortgage con-
tain a description of the collateral-the test being whether the descrip-
tion is sufficiently definite and certain to enable the public in general
to identify the property.21 However, this test does not apply where
there is a dispute between the original parties to a chattel mortgage.22
The test contemplated by the Code provides that even though the
15 Iowa Valve Co. v. Meckle Contracting Co., 258 Ky. 444, 80 S.W. 2d
557 (1935).
1 "No deed or deed of trust or mortgage conveying a legal or equitable
title to real or personal property shall be valid against a purchaser for a valuable
consideration, without notice thereof, or against creditors, until such deed or
mortgage is acknowledged or proved according to law and lodged for record..
K.R.S. sec. 382.270.
17 Starr Piano Company v. Petrey, 168 Ky. 530, 532, 182 S.W. 624, 625
(1916).18 Shraeffer v. Rodman, 146 Ky. 1, 141 S.W. 742 (1911).
39 See e. g. Kerr v. Watkins, 234 Ky. 104, 27 S.W. 2d 679 (1930).
20UCC sec. 9-203(1) (b).21 E.g., Hauseman Motor Co. v. Napierella, 223 Ky. 433, 3 S.W. 2d 1084
(1928) (Property described in chattel mortgage as "one service truck, 3Y2 tons"
and "one Paige truck, two tons" held not sufficient to give constructive notice).22 Hart County Deposit Bank v. Hatfield, 236 Ky. 725, 33 S.W. 2d 660
(1930).
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description is not specific, it is sufficient if it reasonably identifies
what is described.23 At first glance the test under the Code may appear
more liberal than Kentucky's test, but the validity of that conclusion
remains with the courts. Unlike the acknowledgment requirement
under present Kentucky law, the description requirement under Ken-
tucky law and the Code is reasonable, since the description of the
collateral is an inherent part of giving notice. A third party must
be able to identify the collateral described in either a chattel mort-
gage or a security agreement.
Kentucky requires by statute that a chattel mortgage must be
recorded in order for the mortgagee to be protected against a pur-
chaser for a valuable consideration or against creditors. 24 Under the
Code there are two methods by which a secured party may perfect
a security interest against third parties-by taking possession of the
collateral25 or by filing26 except in certain stated instances where fil-
ing is not required. 2' While Kentucky law and the Code both recog-
nize recording as a means of perfecting against third parties, the Code
allows the secured party to perfect by taking possession of the collat-
eral. No case has been found in Kentucky holding that it would
recognize the taking of possession by the secured party as a substitute
for recording a chattel mortgage. But in Davis v. Allen there is dictum
to the effect that possession by a mortgagee of real property would
be a substitute for recording.28 Even if Kentucky applied this rule,
it remains uncertain whether Kentucky would apply the rule to per-
sonal property. An argument for applying the rule that taking of
possession should be a substitute for recording can be made on the
basis of the language in KRS Sec. 378.040 which indicates that a
transfer of possession will perfect against third parties in lieu of re-
cording. Another argument may rest on the analogy to a pledge which
Kentucky recognizes as a valid security transaction. 29
In the event the security interest under the Code is not perfected
by filing, where filing is required, or by possession, a person who be-
comes a lien creditor without knowledge of the security interest will
prevail.3 0 An exception to this rule exists with respect to a secured
23 UCC sec. 9-110.
24 See note 16 supra.
25 UCC see. 9-305.
26 UCC see. 9-802 (1).
27 See exceptions, UCC sec. 9-302.2 8 Davis v. Allen, 280 Ky. 798, 134 S.W. 2d 617 (1939) (Record owner and
mortagee both resided on premises, so facts did not present mortagee in posses-
sion)2 iMason v. Scruggs, 207 Ky. 66, 268 S.W. 833 (1925).
30 UCC see. 9-301 (1) (b). For other classes of persons who take priority over
an unperfected security interest see UCC sec. 9-801 (1) (a) (c) (d).
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party who has an unperfected purchase money security interest in that
he has a ten day grace period during which he can perfect against
a transferee in bulk or a lien creditor.31
In the event a mortgage in Kentucky is not perfected by record-
ing, the statute by its terms, protects purchasers for a valuable con-
sideration and without notice of the unrecorded mortgage, and
creditors.32 The statute is clear with respect to purchasers who are
protected, whereas judicial interpretation was necessary in order to
determine what creditors were protected.
In Mason v. Scruggs,33 the court said:
In 1916 the legislature amended the foregoing Statute by adding
thereto the following:
"The word 'creditors' as used herein shall include all creditors
irrespective of whether or not they may have acquired a lien by legal
or equitable proceedings or by voluntary conveyance."
The court then interpreted the statute:
ETihe expression "all creditors" therein means subsequent creditors,
whether they be secured or unsecured, and such antecedent creditors
who at some time prior to the recording of the mortgage or deed
of trust have secured some equity in the property.
The court in interpreting the statute divided creditors into two
classes, antecedent or those that became creditors before the chattel
mortgage was executed, and subsequent or those that became credi-
tors after the execution of the mortgage.34 Furthermore, the court
interpreted the statute as protecting subsequent creditors whether
secured or unsecured, but provided that antecedent creditors must
secure some equity in the property prior to the recording of the
mortgage. Unlike Kentucky, the Code does not make a distinction
between antecedent and subsequent creditors; instead, the Code treats
all creditors alike by requiring a creditor without notice to obtain a
lien before the security interest is perfected.3 5 The big distinction
between the Code and the Kentucky rule with respect to subsequent
creditors is that under the Code the security interest can be perfected
against a subsequent creditor if done before the subsequent creditor
obtains a lien, whereas under the Kentucky rule an unrecorded chattel
mortgage can never be perfected against a subsequent creditor.386
31 UCC sec. 9-301 (2).
32 See note 16 supra.
33 207 Ky. 66, 68, 268 S.W. 833, 834 (1925).34 For a discussion of the definition of antecedent and subsequent creditor,
see Larimore v. Perkinson, 208 Ky. 382, 271 S.W. 69 (1925).
35 UCC sec. 9-302.36 UCC sec. 9-301 (1) (b).
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Since the distinction is important, which rule should prevail? The
theory behind Kentucky's reason for protecting subsequent creditors
is that an unrecorded mortgage is fraudulent to them, since the
truth does not appear on the record at the time the subsequent
creditor extends credit.3 7 The argument against this view is based
on the assumption that creditors do not rely on the record, an argu-
ment which breaks down when creditors do rely on the record and
find nothing. Certainly it does not seem just to allow a mortgagee
to record a mortgage the day after a subsequent creditor extended
credit and thus perfect it against the subsequent creditor. The
writer agrees with the present Kentucky rule which protects subse-
quent creditors without notice of the unrecorded mortgage, but in
adopting the Code, Kentucky abandoned the rule. Thus, when the
Code takes effect in Kentucky, a creditor must obtain a lien before
an unperfected security interest is perfected.
Place of Filing
With regard to the place of filing a chattel mortgage, the Ken-
tucky statute provides:
(1) Chattel mortgage, in order to be recorded, shall be filed in the
county where the mortgagor, if a resident of the state, resides at the
time of the execution thereof. If the mortgagor is not a resident of
the state, the mortgage shall be filed in the county where the mort-
gaged property is located at the time of the execution of the mort-
gage.38
The Code presents alternative methods of filing, neither alternative
being the same as the present method in Kentucky. The first alter-
native presented by the Code makes the place of filing-either with
Secretary of State or County Clerk-depend on the subject matter
of the collateral and its use. For instance, if the goods are used or
bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes
they are classified as consumer goods.3 9 Where the collateral is con-
sumer goods filing with the county clerk is required.40 On the other
hand, an illustration where local filing is not required is where the
goods are inventory. Again the Code defines the collateral accord-
ing to its use. If they are held by a person who holds them for sale
or lease, or to be furnished under contracts of service or if he has so
furnished them, or if they are raw materals, work in process, or
37 Wicks v. McConnell, 102 Ky. 484, 20 Ky. Law Rep. 84, 43 S.W. 205
(1897).
s K..S. 382.670.
39 UCC sec. 9-109 (1).
40 UCC see. 9-401 (1) Optional Paragraph (a).
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materials used or consumed in a business they are classified as in-
ventory.41 Where inventory is the subject matter of a security agree-
ment filing with the Secretary of State is required.4 Many other
illustrations could be shown where it must first be determined what
the collateral is used for, then classify the collateral according to its
use, and then file the financing statement either with the county
clerk or with the Secretary of State. In states which want to continue
local filing in all cases the Code provides optional language which if
adopted allows duplicate filing.43 Thus, as illustrated above, if the
collateral is consumer goods filing with the county clerk is required
and if the optional language were adopted filing with the Secretary
of State would also be required.
The second alternative presented by the Code is to require filing
with the Secretary of State in all cases, thus, under this alternative
local filing would be abolished in all security transactions concerning
personal property.
The justification given by the Code editors for requiring filing
with the Secretary of State under either of the alternatives just dis-
cussed is that credit information services may thereby have easy access
to information needed by creditors who have debtors in many coun-
ties, without being put to the great cost of digging out the required
information in a multitude of local offices. 44
Kentucky in adopting the Code did not accept either of the Code's
alternative methods of filing the financing statement. Instead Ken-
tucky retained its present system by requiring filing with the county
clerk in all cases and no filing with the Secretary of State in any
case.4 5 By retaining its present system Kentucky has avoided the
necessity of classifying the collateral in order to determine the proper
place of filing. In addition Kentucky avoided the problem of dupli-
cate filing which would create additional expense or the problem
of complete central filing which could create much added expense
and inconvenience to those who desire to check the record. Whether
Kentucky in retaining its present system of local filing defeated one
of the main advancements of the Code remains to be seen. Certainly
the Code intended for central filing in some cases to be required
and Kentucky in adopting the Code did not accept this feature. One
important word of warning should be given at this time. Filing is not
required in all instances in order to perfect a security interest. For
41 UCC sec. 9-109 (4).
42 UCC sec. 9-401 (1) Optional Paragraph (c).
43 Ibid.44 UCC sec. 9-401 (1952) Text and Comments Ed.).45 S.B. No. 169 (1958) (effective 1960).
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example, filing is not required to perfect the security interest where
the secured party has possession; 46 or a purchase money security
interest in farm equipment having a purchase price not in excess of
$2,500. 47
After-Acquired Property and Future Advances
After-acquired property, as the subject matter of a mortgage, is
property which at the time of execution of the mortgage is not owned
by the mortgagor or property which is not yet in existence.48 At
common law a chattel mortgage can operate only on property ac-
tually in existence and belonging to the mortgagor, or potentially
belonging to him as an incident of other property then in existence
and belonging to him.4 9 Kentucky by judicial decision and by statute
has engrafted exceptions on the common law rule. By judicial deci-
sion Kentucky allows a corporation to execute a mortgage to include
the increase of female animals since they are potentially in exist-
ence.50 By statute Kentucky provides that a chattel mortgage given by
any person may cover crops to be planted within one year; tools,
machinery, or farming implements owned at the time of the execu-
tion of the mortgage or which may be thereafter acquired; and re-
placements of any of the property described in the mortgage. 51 In
addition the statute incorporates the exception to the common law
rule by allowing a mortgage to cover the increase of female animals. 52
In any cas6 not within the above exceptions to the common law
rule a mortgage on after acquired property is not valid against third
parties. But in equity as between the parties a chattel mortgage of
after-acquired property operates to create an equitable interest in the
mortgage under the maxim that equity considers that as done which
ought to be done.53 Also, a mortgage of after-acquired property
which creates an equitable interest in the mortgage will be enforced
against third parties with notice.54 But when a mortgage of after-
acquired property is tainted with fraud, it will not be enforced against
-40 UCO sec. 9-302 (1) (a).
47 UCC sec. 9-302 (1) (c). (For other illustrations where filing is not re-
quired see UCO 9-302 (1) (b) (d) (e) (f), (2), (3) (a) (b), (4).4 8 For a good discussion of mortgages on after-acquired property in Kentucky,
see Note, 35 Ky. L.J. 320 (1947).
40 Sandy Valley Grocery v. Patrick, 267 Ky. 768, 770, 103 S.W. 2d 807,
308 (1937).
5 0 Note, 35 Ky. L.J. 320, 329.
51 K.R.S. sec. 882.610.
52 KRS sec. 382.610 (a).
53 Sandy Valley Grocery Co. v. Patrick, 267 Ky. 768, 711, 103 S.W. 2d
807, 308 (1937).
54 Scoggan v. Dillon, 252 S.W. 2d 35 (Ky. 1952). (Trust Agreement cover-
ing after-acquired property created an equitable lien and was recorded).
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a third party with notice. In Sandy Valley Grocery Company v. Patrick
the chattel mortgage covered replacements of stock in trade. The
court recognized that the mortgage created an equitable lien, but
refused to enforce it against third parties stating that a mortgage is
fraudulent and void if it permits the mortgagor to sell from stock
from time to time, although he agrees to replace any stock with stock
of equal value.55 As indicated in the opinion the court was reluc-
tant to reach this conclusion, but felt bound by stare decisis. If the
mortgagee had allowed the mortgagor to dispose of the collateral
without replacing it with stock of equal value, then this would
have constituted fraud and the decision would have been justified.
The Code provides that a security interest will attach when there
is an agreement that it attach, when value is given, and when the
debtor has rights in the collateral.56 It also provides that a security
agreement may provide that collateral, whenever acquired, shall
secure all obligations covered by the security agreement. 57 In per-
mitting a security agreement to cover after-acquired property, the
Code editors assert that they are merely recognizing an existing state
of things by recognizing what has been variously called the floating
charge, the free handed mortgage and the lien on shifting stock.58
If the Code provision permitting the security agreement to cover
after-acquired property were applied to the Sandy Valley Grocery
Company case, the transaction would be upheld as a valid lien on
shifting stock. In addition to this improvement of Kentucky law,
the Code will eliminate the confusion which has resulted from the
cases creating certain exceptions to the common law rule.
"Future advances" is the term applied to an agreement between
the mortgagor and mortgagee wherein the mortgagee agrees to advance
additional money under the mortgage at some future time. By statute
Kentucky provides that a chattel mortgage may secure future ad-
vances, good against all persons, to be made by the mortgagee, at its
option, within one year from the execution of the mortgage, but
not to exceed in the aggregate an amount stated in the mortgage.5 9
No cases have been found in which the court has been faced with
the necessity of interpreting this statute. Like Kentucky, the Code
provides that the security agreement may provide for future ad-
vances.60 In the absence of cases interpreting the Kentucky statute,
55 Supra, note 45.
56 UCC see. 9-204 (1).
57 UCC see. 9-204 (3).
58 UCC see. 9-204 (1952) Text and Comments Ed.).
59 K.R.S. sec. 382.620 (For the statute permitting a mortgage on real prop-
erty to secure future advances, see K.R.S. 382.520).
60 UCC see. 9-204 (5).
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it is futile to attempt to make a comparison between the Kentucky
law and the Code. It is believed that both Kentucky and the Code
would require that the provision for making future advances be stated
in the security instrument. The Code may be broader than the
statute inasmuch as the Code does not contain the limitation that the
advances must be made within one year.
Default
The essence of a security transaction is the rights pertaining to the
parties in the event of default. In Kentucky the mortgagee upon
default is entitled to possession of the mortgaged property if he can
get possession without a breach of the peace.61 When a chattel mort-
gagee takes possession of the mortgaged property after default, the
mortgagee must within a reasonable time, unless the property be
redeemed by the mortgagor, sell the property at a fair sale and on
adequate notice, returning to the mortgagor any surplus over the
balance due.62 In the event the mortgagee cannot get possession, he
may bring an action in equity to foreclose the mortgage.
Under the Code unless otherwise agreed, the secured party has
upon default the right to take possession of the collateral and proceed
without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the
peace. 63 The secured party may sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of
any or all of the collateral subject to the Article on Sales. 64 The
secured party must account to the debtor for any surplus and, unless
otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency.65 The dis-
position may be by public or private proceedings, and the collateral
may be sold as a unit or in parcels.66 The main restrictions are that
the secured party must give the debtor notice of the sale and the sale
must be commercially reasonable.67 The Code gives the debtor a
right to redeem the collateral at any time before the secured party
has disposed of it by tendering fulfillment of all obligations secured
by the collateral plus reasonable expenses incurred by the secured
party.6s In the event the secured party cannot get possession, he may
use the judicial procedures available in order to foreclose.69 Be-
cause the Code provides in a detailed manner the rights of the parties
61 Hawkins Furniture Co. v. Morris, 143 Ky. 738, 137 S.W. 527 (1911).62 Commercial Credit Co. v. Cooper, 246 Ky. 513, 55 S.W. 2d 381 (1933).
63 UCC sec. 9-503.
64 UCC sec. 9-504 (1
65 UCC sec. 9-504 (2).66 UCC sec. 9-504 (3).
67 Ibid.
68 UCC sec. 9-506.
69 UCC sec. 9-501 (1).
1958]
KENTucKY LAW JouRNAL
upon default where the secured party gets possession, it would be an
improvement over the present Kentucky law.
Conclusion
Many articles have appeared in various law reviews concerning an
appraisal of Article Nine of the Code, and the trend favors adoption.
The broad purpose of Article Nine is to eliminate all the various
security devices by substituting one new device called a security
interest. In achieving this result the Code has adopted new termin-
ology of its own in order to eliminate any confusion with the various
security devices that have been made obsolete. The Code provides
a notice type description and abolishes the requirement of acknowl-
edgment, thereby reducing the formal requirements in Kentucky.
The Code changes the Kentucky rule which protects a subsequent
creditor against an unrecorded mortgage by requiring the subsequent
creditor to obtain a lien before the unrecorded mortgage is perfected.
The Code presents alternative methods of filing, one of which con-
templates local filing in certain instances with central filing in others.
The other alternative provides central filing in all cases. Kentucky
in adopting the Code rejected both of these alternatives and retained
its present system of local filing in all cases. In retaining its present
system of local filing Kentucky rejected one of the most important
features presented by the Code. The Code broadens the rule in Ken-
tucky in cases where after-acquired property is used as collateral.
Because Kentucky's statute permitting future advances to be covered
by a chattel mortgage has not been interpreted, it is not possible to
determine whether or not the Code broadens the rule. The Code
sets out well-defined provisions concerning the rights of the parties
upon default. From this perusal of the Code and its effect upon
chattel mortgages in Kentucky, the writer believes that the adoption
of the Code in Kentucky was a progressive step, and will eliminate
much confusion which has resulted in this area.
Richard D. Cooper
THE ORIGINAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF COURTS
IN KENTUCKY
As is indicated by the title, this note is limited to the original
criminal jurisdiction of courts in Kentucky and does not include their
appellate jurisdiction. Since the original jurisdiction of any one of
these courts is subject to exceptions, the jurisdiction of each court is
[Vol. 47,
